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“Exceedingly Vexed and Difficult”:
Games and the First Amendment
Weigand v. Village of Tinley Park, 114 F. Supp. 2d 734 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
The mayor of Tinley Park, Illinois, describes his village as a “dynamic,
progressive community” of more than 45,000 people.1 He claims it is a
“great place to live, work and play.”2 Until September 22, 2000, however,
the village was a “great” place to play only for those who didn’t mind being
ticketed and fined. Far from encouraging the “outdoor recreation and family
oriented fun”3 promised on its website, the village enforced a draconian
ordinance making it unlawful to “play any games upon any street, alley, or
sidewalk, or other public place except when a block party permit has been
issued” by the village government.4 The local code went on to define
“public place” as including “any street, sidewalk, park, cemetery, school
yard, [or] body of water.”5 On its face, the ordinance
prohibit[ed] children from playing tag at recess in the schoolyard
without a block party permit from the Village President and the
Board of Trustees; likewise it would [have] apparently bar[red] a
child from playing with his Gameboy on the sidewalk, or kids from
playing in a pool or river—bodies of water—or skating in the park
without obtaining a permit, and similar absurdities.6
During the summer of 2000, Karen Weigand and two other Tinley Park
residents were charged with “parental irresponsibility,” because their
children violated the ordinance by “play[ing] baseball in the street of their
cul-de-sac.”7 A Cook County judge upheld the measure, saying it “does not

1. Edward J. Zabrocki, Welcome!, at http://www.tinleypark.org/government.htm (last visited
Sept. 4, 2002).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Weigand v. Vill. of Tinley Park, 114 F. Supp. 2d 734, 736 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (citing TINLEY
PARK, ILL., CODE § 99.013 (repealed 2000)), permanent injunction granted, 129 F. Supp. 2d 1170
(N.D. Ill. 2001).
5. Id. (citing TINLEY PARK, ILL., CODE § 10.02).
6. Id.
7. Diana Strzalka, Baseball in Street Lands 4 in Court, CHI. TRIB., June 27, 2000, at 1.
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seem to be beyond the scope of the legislative body of the city.”8 In
response, Weigand and several other local parents challenged the law in
federal court. U.S. District Judge Elaine Bucklo issued a preliminary
injunction against its enforcement, ruling that the parents were likely to
prevail at trial on the issue of the ordinance’s constitutionality.9 A month
after the ruling, the ordinance was repealed.10 In January 2001, Judge
Bucklo made the injunction permanent, forever barring the village from
reinstating the ordinance.11
In her initial ruling, Judge Bucklo noted that the ordinance was
constitutionally flawed in three different ways. First, she held that the
ordinance failed the rational basis test because the village lacked a
legitimate reason for banning games in schoolyards, parks, and pools.12
Second, she found that the ordinance implicated the First Amendment by
infringing upon people’s constitutional right to assemble for the purpose of
engaging in a form of expressive conduct—namely, playing games.13 The
ordinance could not survive strict scrutiny, and so was unconstitutional.14
Finally, citing philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, she ruled that “[t]he term
‘game’ is exceedingly vexed and difficult.”15 Because the ordinance did not
define what a “game” was, it “fail[ed] to articulate with any specificity the
conduct to be proscribed,”16 and so was void for vagueness.
Although I believe Judge Bucklo was correct in invalidating the
ordinance, I disagree with some of her constitutional analysis. This
Comment concentrates on her second rationale for invalidating the
ordinance, challenging the conclusion that games are a type of expressive
8. Lola Smallwood, Tinley Park Parents Strike Out as Judge Bars Games in Street, CHI.
TRIB., June 30, 2000, at 5.
9. Weigand, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 739.
10. Charles Stanley, Tinley Tosses Out Ban on Kids’ Street Play, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 5, 2000, at
1.
11. Weigand, 129 F. Supp. 2d 1170. This decision merely summarizes the court’s earlier
ruling on the preliminary injunction and focuses primarily on whether the case was moot due to
the ordinance’s repeal.
12. Weigand, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 737.
13. See id. Judge Bucklo implicitly recognized that the right to assemble applied only if
games were expressive conduct. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18
(1984) (holding that the right to associate protects only “certain intimate human relationships” and
groups of people “engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment”). Where an
activity is not sufficiently expressive to be subject to First Amendment protection, there is no
constitutional right to gather for the purpose of engaging in that activity. See City of Dallas v.
Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989) (holding that because patrons’ dancing in a nightclub is not
expressive conduct, they have no constitutional right to assemble there); Malden Amusement Co.
v. City of Malden, 582 F. Supp. 297, 299 (D. Mass. 1983) (holding that because video games are
not protected by the First Amendment, it is not a “violation of the freedom to associate” to restrict
the use of video game machines).
14. Weigand, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 737 (noting that the village’s interest in regulating the use of
its streets and sidewalks was not “compelling”).
15. Id. at 738.
16. Id. (quoting Wiemerslage v. Maine Township High Sch. Dist. 207, 29 F.3d 1149, 1151
(7th Cir. 1994)).
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conduct that gives rise to the right of assembly. Part I of this Comment
argues that games in general, including certain types of video games, do not
constitute a form of expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.
Part II considers the special case of sporting events meant to be watched by
an audience. Part III concludes.
I
Judge Bucklo all but assumed that games were a form of
constitutionally protected expressive conduct, noting, “If ‘nude
dancing . . . is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First
Amendment, though . . . only marginally so,’ surely innocent game playing
may be protectable expressive conduct as well.”17 This type of reasoning
sets a dangerous precedent. Granting First Amendment protection to
anything more “innocent” than nude dancing would extend the
Constitution’s penumbra to nearly all forms of noncriminal human activity.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that nude dancing is itself a
borderline case.18 Game playing seems to lack the inherently
communicative features of most other forms of expressive conduct, such as
wearing black armbands,19 flag burning,20 sit-ins,21 and picketing.22
Most importantly, however, Judge Bucklo’s approach is inconsistent
with the doctrine underlying the concept of expressive conduct. As the
Supreme Court has recognized, “it is possible to find some kernel of
expression in almost every activity a person undertakes—for example,
walking down the street or meeting one’s friends at a shopping mall—but
such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of
the First Amendment.”23 In determining whether conduct is sufficiently
expressive to invoke First Amendment protection, the Court looks to
whether “[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and in

17. Id. at 737 (quoting Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (internal citation
omitted)).
18. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566 (“[N]ude dancing of the kind sought to be performed here is
expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment.”); see also Doran v.
Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975).
19. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
20. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
21. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
22. Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308 (1968).
23. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989); see also United States v. O’Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (rejecting “the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be
labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an
idea”).
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the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message
would be understood by those who viewed it.”24
The Court later liberalized the first prong of this test, emphasizing that
“a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of
constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a
‘particularized message,’ would never reach the unquestionably shielded
painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schonberg, or Jabberwocky
verse of Lewis Carroll.”25 In considering the second factor, courts may
consider “whether the activity in question is commonly associated with
expression.”26 The Weigand opinion failed to mention these standards.
Game playing fails both prongs of this test. First, children (or adults)
playing games in the street or on a sidewalk generally do so for their
personal enjoyment, not to convey any sort of message.27 An audience is by
no means a necessary part of their play, as it would be if their actions were
truly meant to be communicative;28 most people would play even if no one
were watching. Second, passersby observing such play do not “commonly
associate[]” game playing with expression, nor would they interpret it as
conveying any sort of meaningful message, except perhaps that the
participants thought the game was fun.29 To allow incidental inferences
from conduct to render such conduct expressive would be to eviscerate the
boundary between expressive and nonexpressive behavior.
For these reasons, games in general are not “sufficiently imbued with
elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First and

24. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (holding that an ordinance
prohibiting the display of the American flag with symbols superimposed on it was an
unconstitutional abridgement of free speech).
25. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569
(1995).
26. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 769 (1988).
27. Judge Bucklo noted that “[a] game might be a part of a political protest, to take the
clearest case (‘Bean the “capitalist” with a cream pie!’).” Weigand, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 737. The
game at issue in Weigand, however, was street baseball played by children; it was not intended to
express a political idea. Of course, even if, as I argue, games are not by their nature expressive
conduct, courts can still find particular games to be expressive on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g.,
infra notes 31-32, 38-39 and accompanying text.
28. At least one Justice has found this to be a constitutionally relevant factor in determining
whether conduct is expressive. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 581 (1991) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (“[D]ancing as aerobic exercise would likewise be outside the First Amendment’s
concern. But dancing as a performance directed to an actual or hypothetical audience [is
constitutionally protected].”).
29. See Allendale Leasing, Inc. v. Stone, 614 F. Supp. 1440, 1454 (D.R.I. 1985) (“[Any
communication in bingo] is singularly in furtherance of the game; it is totally divorced from a
purpose of expressing ideas, impressions, feelings, or information unrelated to the game itself.”).
Nude dancing, in contrast, has been found by the Court to convey a message of sensuality and
“eroticism.” See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 581 (Souter, J., concurring) (“[Dancing] gives expression at
least to generalized emotion or feeling, and where the dancer is nude or nearly so the feeling
expressed, in the absence of some contrary clue, is eroticism, carrying an endorsement of erotic
experience. Such is the expressive content [of nude dancing].”).
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Fourteenth Amendments.”30 Of course, when a game expressly conveys a
particular idea, the First Amendment applies. For instance, in Hammerhead
Enterprises. v. Brezenoff,31 the Second Circuit considered a game called
“Public Assistance,” which sought to “present a striking contrast between
the easy life enjoyed by recipients of public funds, and the numerous
obstacles purportedly confronting employed citizens.”32 “Public
Assistance” represents a clearly identifiable exception, however. Such a
game, pervasively imbued with social commentary, is communicative (and
so entitled to constitutional protection) in a way that bingo, for instance, is
not.33
This approach is also applicable to video games,34 which Judge Bucklo
identified as falling within Tinley Park’s prohibition.35 Many courts in the
early 1980s had no problem finding video games to be outside the First
Amendment’s sphere. Starting from the premise that for “entertainment [to
be] accorded First Amendment protection there must be some element of
information or some idea being communicated,”36 these courts concluded:
In no sense can it be said that video games are meant to inform.
Rather, a video game, like a pinball game, a game of chess, or a
game of baseball, is pure entertainment with no informational
element. . . . [Because] they “contain so little in the way of

30. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974).
31. 707 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1983).
32. Id. at 35. The court went on to describe how “[t]he game’s working people are made to
appear burdened by oppressive taxes, strangled by government regulations, and victimized by
reverse discrimination. Conversely, those receiving welfare benefits are portrayed as lazy [and]
dishonest . . . .” Id.
33. See Allendale Leasing, 614 F. Supp. at 1454 (“In order to be accorded constitutional
protection, however, entertainment must be designed to communicate or express some idea or
information. . . . I do not hesitate to hold that a Bingo game in itself is wholly devoid of the
requisite communicative and informative elements.” (citations omitted)).
34. The three primary works on video games and the First Amendment are all studentwritten; two of them are extremely dated. See David C. Kiernan, Note, Shall the Sins of the Son
Be Visited upon the Father? Video Game Manufacturer Liability for Violent Video Games, 52
HASTINGS L.J. 207 (2000) (arguing that video game manufacturers should be held to a negligence
standard for violent acts committed by minors influenced by their games); see also David B.
Goroff, Note, The First Amendment and the Side Effects of Curing Pac-Man Fever, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 744 (1984) (arguing that regulations of video games and gaming establishments should be
subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment); John E. Sullivan, Note, First Amendment
Protection of Artistic Entertainment: Toward Reasonable Municipal Regulation of Video Games,
36 VAND. L. REV. 1223 (1983) (same).
35. Weigand v. Vill. of Tinley Park, 114 F. Supp. 2d 734, 736 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (noting that
the ordinance would “apparently bar a child from playing with his Gameboy on the sidewalk”).
36. Am.’s Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York, 536 F. Supp. 170, 173
(E.D.N.Y. 1982); see also Kaye v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n, 472 A.2d 809, 810-11 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1983).
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particularized form of expression” [they] cannot be fairly
characterized as a form of [protected] speech . . . .37
Recently, however, due to developments in video game technology,
several courts have rejected this blanket approach, choosing instead to
consider the First Amendment status of each individual game.38 The
modern strategy is: “While video games that are merely digitized pinball
machines are not protected speech, those that are analytically
indistinguishable from other protected media, such as motion pictures or
books, which convey information or evoke emotions by imagery, are
protected under the First Amendment.”39
The courts’ treatment of video games offers an interesting insight into
the constitutional status of traditional games. Those video games that are
essentially “digitized” versions of traditional games have been ruled to lack
sufficient communicative features to warrant constitutional protection,
precisely because the underlying traditional games they represent are not
forms of expression. On the other hand, video games with story lines that
convey information or ideas are closely akin to constitutionally protected
books and movies—media that are inherently communicative—and so fall
under the First Amendment. Simply being a game is not sufficient to bring
either traditional games, or video games, under the Constitution’s
protection.
II
The trickiest case is games that are expressly meant to be watched. The
clearest example of this is televised sports, though this category can include
everything down to a Little League game. Broadcasts of such events are
clearly covered by the First Amendment; a broadcast is a form of
communication, constitutionally protected even if its only purpose is to
entertain.40

37. Am.’s Best Family Showplace, 536 F. Supp. at 174 (quoting Stern Elecs., Inc. v.
Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 857 (2d Cir. 1982)); see also Malden Amusement Co. v. City of Malden,
582 F. Supp. 297, 299 (D. Mass. 1983); People v. Walker, 354 N.W.2d 312, 316-17 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1984); City of St. Louis v. Kiely, 652 S.W.2d 694 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Tommy & Tina,
Inc. v. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, 459 N.Y.S.2d 220, 227 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
38. See Rothner v. City of Chicago, 929 F.2d 297, 303 (7th Cir. 1991).
39. Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 181 (D. Conn. 2002); see also Am.
Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that certain
video games are protected because they “are stories”); Rothner, 929 F.2d at 303.
40. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981) (“Entertainment, as
well as political and ideological speech, is protected.”); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 386 (1969) (“[B]roadcasting is clearly a medium affected by a First Amendment
interest . . . .”).
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The issue of whether the players themselves are engaged in expressive
conduct is more complicated, however. It may seem odd to maintain that
the broadcast of certain images is a form of communication, but that the
actors creating those images are not themselves engaged in communication.
Moreover, it may seem inconsistent to deny constitutional protection to
sporting events, while extending it to other forms of live entertainment
performed before audiences.41 “First Amendment principles governing live
entertainment are relatively clear: short of obscenity, it is generally
protected.”42
Sporting events clearly differ from much live theater, however. First,
“theater usually is the acting out—or singing out—of the written word, and
frequently mixes speech with live action or conduct.”43 In sports, the
players generally don’t speak to the audience at all; the only
communication, if any, is by their moves on the field. This is not to suggest
that pantomime acts fall outside the First Amendment, but merely to
support the claim that in watching a sporting event, an audience would be
unlikely to discern a message.
A second, closely related point is that unlike most theatrical
performances, just about everything an athlete does can be explained by
something other than an attempt to convey an idea to the audience. The
athlete’s main focus is winning; his main concern is his competitors. Even
sports that do not involve direct interaction between competitors often lack
communicative aspects,44 requiring merely the continuous (as in longdistance running or swimming) or periodic (as in golf or bowling) repetition
of a wholly functional motion meant to help the athlete achieve a particular
goal.
Finally, it is important to recognize that the Court’s rationale for
extending First Amendment protection to all nonobscene movies, theatrical
performances, and magazines does not extend to most sporting events. For
instance, regarding magazines, the Court has ruled, “The line between the
informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic
[First Amendment] right. Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda
through fiction. What is one man’s amusement, teaches another’s
41. See Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 63 (1970) (“An actor, like everyone else in our
country, enjoys a constitutional right to freedom of speech, including the right to openly criticize
the Government during a dramatic performance.”).
42. Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 993 F.2d 386, 389 (4th
Cir. 1993).
43. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557-58 (1975) (holding that
preventing the musical Hair from being performed in a public forum violated the First
Amendment).
44. See Caswell v. Licensing Comm’n, 444 N.E.2d 922, 925 (Mass. 1983) (“[N]o case has
ever held or suggested that simple physical activity falls within the ambit of the First Amendment,
at least in the absence of some element of communicating or advancing ideas or beliefs.” (quoting
Sunset Amusement Co. v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 496 P.2d 840, 845-46 (Cal. 1972))).
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doctrine.”45 Similarly, the Court has held that “motion pictures are a
significant medium for the communication of ideas. They may affect public
attitudes and behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal of
a political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought which
characterizes all artistic expression.”46 In light of these other features, “[t]he
importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion is not lessened
by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform.”47
In short, the Court seeks to err on the side of freedom from censorship
by deeming all movies, plays, and written works within the scope of the
First Amendment, because these media can all be used either for
entertainment or expression, and often the two aims are intertwined. In
most sports, the entertainment aspect is all there is; there are no elements of
expression or ideas that might be suppressed.48 It seems that athletes in only
a few sports, such as diving, gymnastics, and figure skating, are sufficiently
close to being theatrical performers or dancers to merit constitutional
protection. Self-expression, creativity, and artistic influence permeate such
sports because the athletes’ motions are influenced largely by aesthetic
considerations and directed toward producing an image of grace and
beauty; they are not primarily controlled by functional, nonexpressive
concerns such as catching a pass or kicking a goal.49
III
Judge Bucklo erred in ruling that games are a form of expression.
While her conclusion yields appealing results in the instant case, it
represents a bold excursion into a little-explored area of First Amendment
jurisprudence and is unsupported by precedent or adequate explanation.
Most games are not expressive, and whatever protection they receive must
come from either the prohibition on overbroad laws established by the Due
Process Clause50 or the democratic process.
—Michael T. Morley

45. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
46. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).
47. Id.
48. See Am.’s Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York, 536 F. Supp. 170, 174
(E.D.N.Y. 1982) (“[A] pinball game, a game of chess, or a game of baseball, is pure entertainment
with no informational element.”).
49. This distinction can be understood by comparing an exhibition of the Harlem
Globetrotters, for instance, to a basketball team’s performance during a traditional game.
50. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.

